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Religious Exemptions and the Limited Relevance of Corporate Identity  
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle1 
 
Abstract 
 Corporate religious liberty appears to be on the rise.  The Supreme Court’s unanimous 
decision in Hosanna Tabor v. EEOC (2012) energized sweeping theories about “freedom of the 
church.”  The Court’s more controversial decision in Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (2014) 
determined that for-profit entities may be legally entitled to claim a corporate religious 
character.  Speaking in the language of rights, commentators have vigorously debated the 
foundations and meaning of these decisions. 
 
 This chapter argues that these debates are misdirected. The special treatment of religion 
in American constitutional law does not properly rest on any theory that religious entities enjoy 
a distinctive set of rights.  Instead, the relevant limitation on government arises from the 
Constitution’s Establishment Clause.  The governing principle, deeply grounded in history, can 
best be understood as a prohibition on government involvement – through regulation or 
financial support – in “purely and strictly ecclesiastical matters.”  That principle (developed at 
greater length in our book, Secular Government, Religious People) explains why the government 
may not decide, for example, who is fit for ministry or which faction within a church is acting in 
fidelity to its original teachings. The principle applies with equal force to the state’s relationship 
with houses of worship, religious non-profit institutions such as schools or charities, and for-
profit businesses whose owners assert a corporate religious character. The only legally relevant 
differences among these types of organizations should be derived from the likelihood that the 
principle will be implicated in any particular case. 
 
 After reviewing the 19th century underpinnings of this singular approach, and offering 
pertinent reminders of limits on state financial support for religious teaching, the chapter 
focuses primarily on the context of employment regulation.  Along the way, the chapter 
addresses concrete questions, such as whether a for-profit business can ever successfully assert 
a ministerial exception with respect to any of its employees. The answer may surprise you. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The authors are both affiliated with George Washington University. Ira C. Lupu is the F. 
Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor Emeritus; Robert W. Tuttle is the David R. and Sherry 
Kirschner Berz Research Professor of Law and Religion.  
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 In 21st century America, religion tends to be understood in individualistic terms.  
Believers typically articulate their faith in terms of a personal relationship with God.  Most 
religious people, however, live out their faith in the company of others.  Quite frequently, these 
associations are organized as corporations – entities in which the body as a whole possesses 
unified legal personhood.  In this chapter, we explore the implications of that legal personhood 
for the exercise of religion, and more particularly for the question of religious exemptions from 
general laws.  
 
 This exploration occurs against the backdrop of the prominent and recent focus on “the 
freedom of the church,” advocated by a number of scholars in this field.2  Although proponents 
of that concept differ in various ways, they share a commitment to the idea that religious 
institutions are constitutionally entitled to a zone of freedom in which to govern themselves.  
Beyond that abstract proposition, however, these proponents tend to ignore crucial questions 
about the meaning and scope of “the freedom of the church.”   
 
 First, many offer no guidance for determining which institutions, apart from houses of 
worship, constitute “the church.”3  Is a large state-funded non-profit, such as a hospital or social 
welfare agency, “the church” simply because it has a religious name and origin?  Can for-profit 
entities ever come within the boundaries of “the church”?  Who counts as the church when rival 
factions claim authority?  Second, the proponents fail to specify the scope of “internal 
governance,” a category within which proponents claim churches to be autonomous.  Are all 
                                                 
2 See chapters XX-XX in this book. 
3 Zoe Robinson offers guidance in What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 181 
(2014), but for reasons developed below, we think her approach is deeply flawed.   
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matters involving corporate structure, employment relations, or uses of church property off-
limits to the state?  
 
 Moreover, to the extent that “internal governance” conflicts with government regulation, 
proponents fail to specify how such conflicts should be resolved.4  Some who argue for church 
autonomy emphasize the method of interest balancing, in which the liberty claims of the church 
are set off against the state’s interest in enforcing its laws.5  This interest balancing has been 
formalized in statutes like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  
 
 We think this emphasis on the “freedom of the church” and the accompanying method of  
interest balancing are profoundly misguided.  As we have explored at length elsewhere,6 the 
story of religious liberty in America is not one of mandatory religion-specific accommodations, 
or an autonomous domain for “the church.”  Instead, the roots of religious liberty can be traced 
to limits on the state’s character.  A secular government is barred, by its basic identity as 
expressed in the Establishment Clause, from proclaiming religious truth or adjudicating religious 
questions.  This prohibition certainly creates a zone of non-interference, but the justification for 
that limit does not arise from the liberty of religious institutions.7  
 
                                                 
4 See Richard Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”:  (Towards) an Exposition, Translation, and 
Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33 (2013) (dismissing concern about line-drawing 
as common to all legal doctrines).  This is not an adequate response, because one only knows the 
meaning of a legal norm by understanding how it applies in the context of other norms. 
5 Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub Pol’y 253 (2009). 
6 Ira C, Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Secular Government, Religious People (Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Co., 2014) 
7 Religious institutions do enjoy robust rights of association and expression, but only to the 
extent enjoyed by analogous non-religious institutions.  Secular Government, Religious People, 
chapter 5. 
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 The misplaced emphasis on the liberty of religious institutions becomes even more 
problematic when coupled with the use of interest balancing to reconcile the claims of liberty 
with the concerns of the state.  In addition to the notorious indeterminacy of interest balancing as 
a method, the context of religious rights raises particular problems for that method.  Those 
problems relate directly to the core issues of the state’s limited competence.  In applying RFRA 
and its legal analogues, a court often must first decide whether a plaintiff’s religious exercise has 
been “substantially burdened” by government action.  That inquiry, if rigorously pursued, would 
require the court to assess the religious significance of the practice at issue.  But such religious 
determinations are outside the state’s competence.8 
 
 Our approach avoids the problems that arise from using “the freedom of the church” as 
the driving norm, as well as interest balancing as the method for addressing problems.  Our 
general thesis in this chapter is that corporate entities with asserted religious identities deserve 
exceptional treatment only with respect to their distinctively religious activities.  The state may 
not participate in or, other than prevention of force or fraud, regulate the distinctive aspects of 
religious experience: gathering for worship, religious instruction, and spiritual or sacramental 
celebration of life’s major events.  
  
As we explain, religious exercise may take corporate form for a wide spectrum of actions 
and purposes.  At one end of the spectrum sit houses of worship, the paradigmatic form of 
religious corporation.  Such entities tend to be heavily engaged in performance of distinctively 
religiously activities. No one questions the religious identity of such institutions, although 
                                                 
8 Id. at chapter 6. 
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questions remain about the implications that follow from such recognition.  Even houses of 
worship act in ways that are not religiously distinctive at all.  Like many secular entities, houses 
of worship (for example) build and use parking facilities for their members and guests, and they 
prepare and serve food at large gatherings they host.  These kinds of activities are subject to 
regulation in the public interest. 
 
 In the broad middle of the spectrum are found many organizations that assert religious 
identities but act in ways considerably removed from the typical functions of houses of worship.  
These organizations cover an immense range.  They include social welfare organizations, such as 
shelters for the homeless or victims of domestic violence; educational institutions, ranging from 
pre-schools to research universities; hospitals and assisted living facilities; and many others.  
Because this middle category includes such a wide variety of activities and purposes, and covers 
a range in size that runs from tiny neighborhood organizations to multi-billion dollar hospital 
chains, the category presents an endless variety of questions about how the corporations’ 
religious identity should affect their legal rights and obligations.  
 
The distinctive religious character of these organizations is frequently quite thin.  For 
example, religiously affiliated hospitals are far more like secular private hospitals, or even 
publicly controlled hospitals, than they are like churches, mosques, or synagogues.  Granted, 
religiously affiliated hospitals may refrain for religious reasons from offering certain services, 
but in what they do offer, their resemblance to all other hospitals is striking.  Religious 
exemptions for non-profit organizations in this broad mid-range should be directly linked to the 
religiously distinctive activities they undertake. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, highlighted by the decision in Hobby Lobby, are for-
profit entities that claim a religious identity, despite their full involvement in the economic 
marketplace.  For-profit entities are strikingly similar to one another in the profit-making motives 
that animate them, and in the goods and services in which they traffic.  Yet even for-profit firms 
may act in religiously distinctive ways, disconnected from profit motives, such as recognizing a 
Sabbath or other religious holidays.  Although the Administration argued in Hobby Lobby that 
for-profit corporations are incapable of engaging in the “exercise of religion,” the Supreme Court 
ruled otherwise.9  Despite this recognition, the Supreme Court’s decision leaves open significant 
questions about the legal consequences that should flow from the successful assertion of 
religious identity by a commercial entity.  Going forward, the questions after Hobby Lobby will 
be far less about which entities have rights of religious exercise, and far more about precisely 
what rights of religious exercise corporate identities may legitimately assert. 
 
In what follows, we analyze questions of corporate identity and religious exemptions 
along the lines we have suggested in these introductory paragraphs.  The extent to which an 
organization and its activities are distinctively religious will go a long way in explaining when 
religious exemptions are appropriate.  Across the board, such exemptions should be directly 
related to the religiously distinctive qualities the exemptions are designed to recognize and 
protect.  Religion-specific exemptions that are unrelated to those qualities are rarely more than 
unjustifiable special privileges for religious entities over their secular counterparts. 
 
                                                 
9 The Hobby Lobby majority rejected that argument, and only Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor 
agreed with it. Justices Breyer and Kagan abstained from decision on the question. 
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Houses of Worship 
 
 For many traditions, the most significant religious experiences are corporate.  The 
community of faith gathers for prayer, liturgy, and instruction.  Individuals may practice aspects 
of the faith in isolation, but that practice is subordinate to communal experience.  Characterizing 
that religious experience as nothing more than the associational sum of participating individuals’ 
religious experiences misses a crucial element of corporate religious experience.  In much of the 
Christian tradition, for example, the church itself is indispensible for salvation.  It is the “Body of 
Christ,” in which members are united with the savior and all other believers, living and dead. 
From this theological perspective, the believer’s union with the sacred community is prior to and 
distinct from his or her individuated life in the world.  Most fundamentally, the church gives life 
to the believer, not vice versa (as a traditional theory of associations would hold).   Because of 
this theological priority for so many believers, any adequate account of religious freedom should 
acknowledge the concern about the integrity of religious community.   
 
 This theological understanding of religious entities underlies the legal assertion of 
“church autonomy,” an institutional parallel to the idea of personal autonomy, which marks off a 
zone of freedom from state control.  Advocates of this idea seem to believe that the only way the 
government can show concern for the integrity of the church is to adopt a stance of broad 
deference.  Within the boundaries of “church,” authority belongs to those assigned it by religious 
doctrine.  The state shows its respect for the “freedom of the church” by denying that the state 
has jurisdiction, except in rare instances, over matters that the church deems “internal” to its faith 
and practice. 
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 The idea of church autonomy certainly has a long historical pedigree, reaching back to 
the Gregorian reforms of the middle ages.  But broad notions of church autonomy cannot be 
reconciled with the history and current jurisprudence of “church and state” – the legal 
relationship between civil authority and houses of worship.  From the early years of the republic, 
the law has treated houses of worship much the same as other legal entities.  Although Virginia 
barred religious congregations from incorporating, other states did not follow suit, and regularly 
granted corporate charters to houses of worship. 
 
 As Professor Gordon’s recent work demonstrates, these religious corporations were 
bound by the same web of state law on matters of tort, property, contract and corporate status as 
other entities.10  For example, general laws of incorporation that arose in the early 19th century in 
America frequently included a requirement that churches create boards of trustees controlled by 
lay members of a congregation rather than its clergy. States imposed this condition as a way to 
limit ecclesiastical power.11  Thus, as an historical matter, a general doctrine of “church 
autonomy” for churches held in corporate form is a complete fiction.  Nothing in American state 
or federal law supports the idea that houses of worship enjoy a presumptive, general immunity 
from the government’s jurisdiction. 
 
 The only exceptions to this principle of non-distinctiveness can be found in the contexts 
of factional disputes within congregations or conflicts about ministerial employment.  These 
                                                 
10 Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Disestablishment: Limits on Church Power and Property 
Before the Civil War, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 307 (2014). 
11 States also included limits on the total value of property held by a single religious entity.  Id. 
 9 
exceptions are best understood as reflections of the state’s limited competence in matters of 
religious doctrine.12  During the first half of the 19th century, state courts wrestled with a wide 
variety of intra-congregational or intra-denominational disputes, in which two or more factions 
vied for control of a religious body.  Although some courts were willing to hear lawsuits that 
turned on quintessentially theological issues, such as the orthodoxy of certain beliefs about 
human sinfulness, a significant number of courts expressed uneasiness about such inquiries. 
 
 A pair of US Supreme Court cases, decided in 1871 and 1872, vividly illustrates the 
emerging idea of how the exercise of the state’s power to adjudicate should interact with houses 
of worship.   In Watson v. Jones,13 the Court considered a dispute that had arisen out of the 
response of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (“PCUSA”) to the Civil 
War.  A congregation in Louisville, Kentucky had divided over the issues of slavery and 
secession.  The national denomination ruled that the pro-slavery faction had departed from the 
doctrine of the PCUSA, and accordingly, that the anti-slavery faction was entitled to control the 
congregation and its property. The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court.  Applying a 
version of federal common law, rather than constitutional principles, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled that courts were barred from deciding “strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions.”  
Instead, the dispute must be resolved by deference to the body within the church that has 
decision-making power over such questions – in this case, that body was the PCUSA. 
 
 That Watson v. Jones was about questions that are off limits to the state rather than 
church autonomy was vividly demonstrated just one year later, in the Court’s decision in Bouldin 
                                                 
12 For elaboration see Secular Government, Religious People, chapter 2. 
13 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
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v. Alexander.14  A dispute had arisen within a Baptist congregation in the District of Columbia.  
The founding minister, Rev. Albert Bouldin, had lost the support of a majority of the 
congregation as well as all four of the congregation’s trustees.  Bouldin selected a new set of 
trustees from among his followers and together they proceeded to change the locks on the church 
and bar the rest of the congregation from entering.  
 
 The four originally elected trustees sued to regain the use of the property and to have 
Bouldin’s acts declared unlawful.  Bouldin argued that the Supreme Court had no authority over 
this internal religious dispute.  The Court disagreed.  Although the Court reaffirmed the previous 
year’s ruling in Watson that the state may not answer certain ecclesiastical questions, the state 
may nevertheless use ordinary principles of corporate law to determine who has authority to 
resolve those questions for the church.   In Bouldin’s case, the Court held that the minister lacked 
the authority to unilaterally replace the trustees elected by the congregation. Under the 
congregation’s governing documents, the authority to appoint trustees was held by the 
congregation acting through majority vote.   
 
 Thus, by 1872, federal common law recognized no theory of church autonomy.  Rather, 
the law treated houses of worship precisely as it treated other entities, except when courts were 
asked to resolve “strictly and purely ecclesiastical questions.” 
  
 In the second half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court reinforced and provided 
constitutional grounding to the principles reflected in Watson and Bouldin.  In a series of 
                                                 
14 82 U.S. 131 (1872). 
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decisions in the 1950s and 1960s about property disputes, the Court limited the authority of 
courts and legislatures to intervene in the resolution of controversies over ecclesiastical 
questions. The Court repeatedly ruled that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment 
mandated the application of what was a common law principle in Watson v. Jones.15  
 
 Presbyterian Church in the United States vs. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial 
Presbyterian Church16 provides the starkest example of this constitutional understanding.  In the 
mid-1960’s, a number of Presbyterian congregations disagreed with their denomination’s 
position on several theological and social issues, including the ordination of women, support for 
the civil rights movement, and opposition to the Vietnam War.  When the congregations 
attempted to exit the denomination and retain ownership of the local church property, litigation 
ensued.  The Georgia courts resolved those disputes by invoking a principle of implied trust, 
under which title to the property depended on which faction was acting in fidelity to the true 
doctrine of the church.  Applying that principle, the jury found in favor of the local congregation. 
Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the First 
Amendment bars civil courts from deciding the kind of question the jury in Georgia had been 
charged with answering. Instead, the Court ruled, the Georgia courts must find ways to resolve 
this dispute without considering such ecclesiastical questions. 
 
 In the aftermath of Blue Hull, the Court made a series of decisions reaffirming, in 
constitutional terms, the companion principle from Bouldin v. Alexander.  The series culminated 
                                                 
15 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 
94 (1952); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Presbyterian Church v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
16 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
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a decade after Blue Hull in Jones v. Wolf,17 which again involved disputes within Presbyterian 
congregations in Georgia.  In an opinion by Justice Blackmun for a five Justice majority, the 
Court decided that state courts have a choice when presented with disputes over control of 
church property.  These disputes can be resolved either by deferring to the body within the faith 
community that has authority over the relevant ecclesiastical questions, or by using “neutral 
principles of law” to examine the legal documents that identify ownership of the disputed 
property. By invoking the concept of “neutral principles,” the Court reaffirmed and gave 
constitutional warrant to the common law approach of Bouldin – churches are subject to the 
same norms of contract, property, and trust law as other entities.  What remains out of bounds 
after Jones v. Wolf is what has always been out of bounds – the judicial resolution of “strictly 
and purely ecclesiastical questions.” 
 
 In a pair of cases addressing disputes over ecclesiastical personnel, the Court has applied 
an identical set of principles about the scope and limits of judicial power.  The first of these, 
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese of America v. Milivojevich (1976),18 involved a bishop’s 
challenge to his removal.  After the Illinois courts ordered the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church 
to reinstate Milivojevich, the Supreme Court reversed. Echoing the themes from its decision in 
Blue Hull, the Court held that decisions over who is fit to hold ecclesiastical office belong solely 
to church authorities.  Civil courts are constitutionally incompetent to decide who belongs in 
such a role.    
 
                                                 
17 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
18 426 U.S. 696 (1976). 
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 The Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor19 is a direct outgrowth of this line of decisions.   
Hosanna-Tabor does not stand for any sweeping “freedom of the church.”  The decision would 
never have garnered the votes of all nine Justices if its foundation were so broad, vague in 
contour, and inconsistent with the past several hundred years of American law.  Instead, the 
“ministerial exception” embraced in Hosanna-Tabor reflects precisely the constitutionally 
mandated allocation of competence over the question of who is fit for the role of clergy or 
teacher of the faith. The exception’s contours respond directly to the need of religious 
communities to have full control over who transmits their defining message. 
 
 That said, whether a particular position falls within the ministerial exception is a question 
that civil courts are necessarily qualified to answer.  If they were not, the ministerial exception 
would effectively immunize religious entities from ordinary employment law norms.  Churches 
would always be able to assert that any of their employees function as ministers, and courts 
would be bound to accept that determination.  Instead, the ruling in Hosanna Tabor reserves to 
courts the authority to decide, in light of the exception’s underlying justification, which positions 
the exception covers. 20  In this respect, courts’ competence to decide which positions are 
covered is analogous to courts’ role in determining which private activities government is 
forbidden, under the Establishment Clause, to directly fund.  In making these judgments, like all 
others under the Establishment Clause, courts are called upon to draw lines about the limits of 
the state’s power.  
 
                                                 
19 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
20 For a nice example of a close case and the court’s proper handling of it, see Archdiocese of 
Washington v. Moerson, 399 Md. 637; 925 A.2d 659 (2007).  
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  Thus, Hosanna-Tabor does not recognize any general “freedom of the church.” The 
unanimous opinion in Hosanna-Tabor explicitly left open questions that might arise between a 
clergy member and her employer under the law of contract and tort.  For example, if a rabbi has 
served a congregation for the past month under an employment contract, and the congregation 
refuses to pay his salary at the end of the month, the rabbi may sue and recover his unpaid 
wages.  Under general principles of law, the employer-congregation may not assert his unfitness 
or inadequacy in the role as a defense to his claim, though the employer may discharge him and 
avoid future wage claims.21   
 
 Similarly, if the assistant pastor of a congregation alleges that she was sexually assaulted 
by the congregation’s senior pastor, she would certainly have tort claims against the senior 
pastor, and perhaps also against the congregation for negligent hiring or supervision of the senior 
pastor.22  Like the rabbi’s claim for back wages, the assistant pastor’s claim of sexual assault 
would require no inquiry into ecclesiastical questions, and therefore does not implicate the 
constitutional concerns that justify the ministerial exception. 
   
 Another striking example of a religious exemption that cannot be traced to any distinctive 
limits on the state’s authority in religious matters is the “parsonage exemption” from federal 
income tax.23  This provision of the Internal Revenue Code exempts from the income of 
members of the clergy the value of housing provided by the house of worship that employs them, 
                                                 
21 We explore additional examples of such disputes in Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, 
Clergy and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 Geo. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 119 (2009). 
22 Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1789. 
23 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 107. 
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as well as any housing allowance similarly provided.  This treatment of housing and housing 
allowances deviates sharply from the tax treatment afforded similar benefits provided by 
employers to other kinds of employees; in all non-clergy cases, such provisions are taxable 
unless the particular housing provided is for the employer’s convenience, such as a university 
president’s residence on campus.  Although the parsonage exemption was perhaps once justified 
by the practice of congregations providing housing attached to the house of worship, thus 
allowing the minister to be readily reached by parishioners in need, the current scope of the 
“parsonage exemption” bears little relation to that original situation.  Now, clergy may use the 
parsonage exemption to exclude from income tax a housing allowance that subsidizes a 
mortgage for a home distant from the place of worship, and quite a bit more valuable than the 
use of a unit attached to the church.  It is no wonder that the exemption has been the subject of 
recent attack under the Establishment Clause.24 
 
 Even though the ministerial exception applies to a relatively narrow set of employees, 
houses of worship have an additional exemption that applies to all employees.  Under Section 
702, religious institutions are exempt from Title VII’s ban on employment discrimination “with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion….”  In other words, religious 
institutions, unlike other employers, are free to hire employees who share the institution’s faith 
commitments.25 
 
                                                 
24 Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Lew, __ F.Supp.3d ___ (W.D. Wisc. 2013), vacated on 
standing grounds, __ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. 2014). 
25 In contrast to the ministerial exception, Section 702 does not exempt religious institutions 
from Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin.  See 
Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, U.S. Assistant Attorney General (Oct. 12, 2000), at 30–
32 and cases cited therein, archived at http://perma.cc/PAL9-3NE4.  
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 Thus far, in our discussion of the state’s distinctive treatment of churches, we have 
focused on the exemption of religious organizations from legal norms that apply to analogous 
non-religious entities.  Any comprehensive consideration of the distinctive role of houses of 
worship in the constitutional order, however, must also come to grips with deeply rooted 
constitutional norms concerning government’s financial support for the activities of such 
organizations.  Indeed, in all the talk in this volume about the distinctive rights of autonomous 
religious institutions, there is precious little attention to this component of the church-state 
relationship.  
 
 We cannot in this space survey all developments in this part of the subject.  But we must 
note both the historical and contemporary concerns about direct government support for houses 
of worship and those who lead them.  Jefferson’s Bill for Religious Liberty in Virginia, one of 
the earliest and most important moves in this direction, explicitly forbade any state support for 
“any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever.”26 The U.S. Supreme Court has developed 
a complex body of law about government aid to religious organizations that provide various 
social services with secular value, such as education or health care.  But the Court has 
consistently affirmed that the government may not fund the core religious activities of worship, 
proselytizing, or religious instruction.27  
 
                                                 
26 Va. Const. Art. 1, § 16. 
27 For analysis of a difficult context in which to apply this principle, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert 
W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of 
Separationism, 43 B. C. L. Rev. 1139 (2002).  See also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) 
(government had discretion to exclude study of ministry from voucher-type state support). 
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 The constitutional status of houses of worship thus reveals a distinctive limitation on state 
power.  The state has no legitimate interest in matters that are “strictly and purely ecclesiastical.”  
Thus, government may not decide questions of that character, including who is fit to lead a 
congregation.  In a precisely complementary norm, the government may not subsidize 
institutions or positions devoted primarily to such matters.   Recognizing the reach and limit of 
these principles will take us a very long way in assessing the constitutional status of other 
organizations that hold themselves out as religious.  
 
Religious Non-profit Organizations 
 
 The category of religious non-profits encompasses a broad variety of organizations.  
These entities include institutions engaged in education at all levels, healthcare, social welfare 
services such as adoption and foster care, and faith-based political advocacy.  They relate to 
houses of worship or religious denominations in a variety of ways, including complete control of 
the non-profit by a single congregation, affiliation with a denomination, sponsorship by an inter-
faith coalition, or complete independence from any religious body. 
 
 To what extent should the religious identity of these non-profits affect their legal rights or 
duties? As in the case of houses of worship, the distinctive identity of religious non-profits can 
have implications for both government regulation and government financial support.  The 
concern for government involvement in the formation of religious character and the proclamation 
of religious ideas leads to heightened sensitivity, but not to categorical immunity from regulation 
or exclusion from support. 
 18 
 
 Our approach differs markedly from that of scholars who ask whether or not particular 
institutions have a set of designated characteristics that mark them as religious.28  Under such an 
approach, if the entity satisfies that test, then it enjoys the same broad freedom from regulation as 
houses of worship; those who fail the test are treated identically with secular non-profits.  
 
 We think such a binary approach is unhelpful or worse.  Most importantly, this approach 
suffers from all of the defects of the justifiably discredited concept of “pervasively sectarian” 
institutions.  Under the law as it stood from the early 1970’s through at least the late 1990’s, 
pervasively sectarian entities – typically, religious elementary and secondary schools -- were 
disqualified from receiving direct public support.  Such disqualification created a strong 
incentive for institutions to change or dilute their religious character in order to make themselves 
eligible for government support.  A binary measure for immunity from regulation would likewise 
create incentives to alter or strengthen religious character as a way to obtain that benefit.  
Whether the incentives are to weaken or strengthen, in either case the binary approach is an 
invitation to inauthenticity and manipulation of religious identity. 
 
 Even if the institutions are acting in complete good faith, the binary approach requires 
bureaucrats and judges to make fine-grained determinations about the extent to which an 
organization has a religious identity.  In some contexts, that inquiry is not problematic.  For 
example, IRS officials sometimes do this for the limited purpose of ensuring that an organization 
                                                 
28 Zoe Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 181 (2014). 
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claiming to be religious is not a fraud.29   However, in the broader context of all legal treatment 
of non-profit institutions, the binary test requires officials to undertake a much more expansive 
and less focused examination.  Judge McConnell’s well-known opinion in the Colorado 
Christian University case30 powerfully explains the constitutional and practical defects of a 
searching inquiry into the degree of religiosity manifested by the school in its curriculum, hiring 
and admissions policies, and other expectations for students and faculty.   
 
 From our perspective, the most important argument against the binary approach is the 
absence of a reliable link between the religious character of an institution and the specific claim 
of legal privilege at issue.  Some claims of legal privilege, such as the ministerial exception, have 
a very strong connection with concerns about the state’s limited competence in matters of 
doctrine and worship. Other claims of legal privilege, however, have no connection with the 
state’s limited competence in such matters.  For example, an exemption of religiously based day 
care centers from state licensing requirements has virtually no connection with those concerns.  
The licensing of day care facilities, which typically involves health and safety regulations, 
background checks on caregivers, and occasional inspections, reflects a core exercise of the 
state’s legitimate role in protecting children from risk.  The religious identity of any particular 
day care center should have no bearing on the state’s regulatory authority over the center, 
because the state’s concern focuses solely on the well-being of children.  
 
 As with houses of worship, the government interacts with religious non-profits in two key 
areas – employment relationships and government funding.  Unlike houses of worship, however, 
                                                 
29 Church of the Chosen People v. U.S., 548 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Minn. 1982). 
30 Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2008). 
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government interactions with the broader set of religious non-profits pose much more 
complicated questions in both areas. 
 
Employment Relationships 
 
 Government regulation of employment relationships within religious non-profits raises a 
variety of constitutional and statutory issues.  It seems best to begin with the ministerial 
exception, which rests on constitutional grounds.  As we explained above, the ministerial 
exception significantly limits government inquiry into religious employers’ decisions about 
certain employees.  In houses of worship, the exception applies to employees whose job involves 
the transmission of faith.  For the broader category of religious non-profits, the analysis is 
exactly the same.  A chaplain in a religious hospital would certainly be covered, as would a 
professor of theology at a seminary. 
 
 Beyond the positions that replicate core aspects of the minister’s role in a house of 
worship, religious non-profits may claim the protection of the ministerial exception for other 
jobs.  Courts must evaluate each position, rather than categories of employees, with respect to its 
relationship to the purposes of the exemption. In close cases, courts should give greater 
deference to institutions that are directly involved in the articulation of religious ideas or delivery 
of religious experience, such as schools, counseling services, publishers dedicated to production 
of religious works, or summer camps.  Correspondingly, courts should give less deference to 
institutions that are predominantly oriented to the delivery of discrete services with obvious 
secular counterparts, such as healthcare, adoption and other family services, housing, or job 
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training.  In such service organizations, courts should require strong proof that the role in 
question involves the explicit transmission of faith, not just a requirement to serve as a role 
model for the faithful. 
 
 Like houses of worship, other religious non-profits also may claim the benefit of Section 
702 of Title VII – they may prefer co-religionists with respect to all employment positions.  
Although the Section 702 exemption may seem uncontroversial with respect to houses of 
worship, its justification is less apparent when applied to all activities and positions within 
religious non-profits.  Why should a religiously affiliated hospital be free to insist that its 
accountants or janitors, for example, share the faith commitments of the employer?  Indeed, the 
original version of the Section 702 exemption was limited to employees engaged in religious 
activities.  Congress amended Section 702 in 1972, in response to concerns about line-drawing 
among various jobs and the extent to which they involved religious activities.  
 
 Is the amended Section 702, which applies to all activities of religious non-profits, 
disproportionate to any reasonable need for exemption from anti-discrimination norms?  
Although the Section 702 exemption certainly imposes costs on individuals excluded from 
employment because they do not share the employer’s faith, the exemption nonetheless protects 
legitimate and distinctive concerns of faith institutions.  Most importantly, the exemption permits 
religious non-profits to employ only individuals who share their mission.  Seen in that light, the 
exemption is designed to avoid discrimination against religious organizations rather than respond 
to a religiously distinctive need for separate legal treatment.  The exemption places religious 
non-profits on equal footing with other cause-oriented organizations.  The Democratic Party may 
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insist that all its employees be enrolled as voting Democrats; likewise, environmental groups 
may require all employees to embrace green commitments.  
 Although the protection afforded by Section 702 is thus closely linked to legitimate 
interests of religious institutions, a different aspect of employment law shows how protections 
for religious nonprofits may lack justification under any of the relevant constitutional concerns.  
Under current law, adjunct faculty at colleges and universities are eligible to form unions and 
engage in collective bargaining with school administrators.  Because of the increasing percentage 
of non-tenured faculty members in higher education, the right to organize offers an important 
protection for a large and growing body of workers.  However, federal courts have ruled that the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) lacks the authority to require religious colleges to 
permit union organizing among, or to engage in collective bargaining with, adjunct faculty.31  
Those who defend the exemption for religious colleges ground it in the autonomy of religious 
institutions.  Government involvement in the relationship between teachers and administrators, 
they contend, would violate the schools’ “right to be free from government meddling and 
intrusion in their operations and beliefs.”32 
 This asserted right can be traced back to the Supreme Court’s 1979 decision in NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago,33 which involved an effort to form a union among lay teachers at 
parochial schools in Chicago.  The Court construed the National Labor Relations Act to exclude 
the employment relationship between lay teachers and church-operated schools.  In its rationale 
                                                 
31 University of Great Falls Montana v. NLRB, 278 F. 3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
32 Brief of Cardinal Newman Society, et. al., in Pacific Lutheran University and SEIU Local 925, 
Before the National Labor Relations Board, available at 
http://www.alliancealert.org/2014/03/31/newman-society-catholic-colleges-challenge-federal-
labor-board-in-possible-landmark-case-newman-society/. 
33 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
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for the decision, the Court emphasized the Establishment Clause limitations on government 
funding of religious schools.  At that time, schools that fit the Court’s description of “pervasively 
sectarian” were categorically ineligible for government funding because such funding necessarily 
carried the risk of “excessive entanglement” between government and religion.  The limits on 
government funding, the Court explained, are necessary to avoid governmental intrusion in 
decisions about the extent to which religion is incorporated in the curriculum.  
 Catholic Bishop appropriately extended that categorical logic to the question of NLRB 
jurisdiction.  The Court reasoned that government supervision of the collective bargaining 
process might be similarly intrusive. What the government may not fund it likewise may not 
regulate, outside of basic concerns about force and fraud. 
 Even at that time, however, few colleges and universities fell into the class of 
“pervasively sectarian” entities, and so most religious colleges qualified for a wide range of 
government funding programs.34  Concerns about excessive entanglement were much less 
significant in that setting, so the risk of unconstitutional intrusion by the NLRB should have been 
correspondingly weaker.  Now that the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has 
refocused on the character of specific activities rather than institutions as a whole, those concerns 
are weaker still.  Nonetheless, and despite the NLRB’s continued efforts to assert jurisdiction, 
federal courts continue to hold that the agency has no authority over the relationship between 
religious colleges and their teachers.   
 Indeed, most recent litigation involves not the fundamental question of religious schools’ 
exemption, but rather the agency’s definition of religious schools.  The agency has attempted to 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
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deploy a narrow definition, akin to the old category of “pervasively sectarian schools.”  Under 
that standard, the Catholic Bishop exemption would apply only to schools that demonstrate their 
religious character by, for example, preferring co-religionists in admission, requiring faculty and 
students to adhere to certain beliefs, and imposing mandatory religious curriculum.   Religious 
colleges contend that the NLRB’s test impermissibly involves the government in what are 
essentially religious determinations, such as the extent to which religious commitments are 
present in a school’s curriculum. 
 We have a great deal of sympathy with that particular concern about the NLRB’s 
definitional approach, but not with the religious colleges’ broad claim of exemption.  The 
NLRB’s test rests on a fundamental error.  Whatever justification the Court had for exempting 
parochial schools in Catholic Bishop, no such rationale can support the current categorical 
exemption of religious colleges from NLRB jurisdiction.  Any concerns about NLRB intrusion in 
religious education can be handled by regulatory measures far more precise than the categorical 
exemption of religious higher education.  For example, the college could be required to bargain 
only over a set of indisputably secular conditions of employment, such as wages and hours, 
benefits, or office space.  That more refined treatment of religious colleges, unlike the current 
institutional exclusion, satisfies the concern for treatment that is closely tailored to distinctive 
limits on the state’s power in dealing with religious matters.   
Government Funding 
 Over the last two decades, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on government funding of 
faith-based institutions has taken a dramatic turn.  During the 1970s, the Court adopted a 
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categorical prohibition on government aid for “pervasively sectarian” organizations.35  Under 
that formulation, the Establishment Clause barred government support for entities that engage in 
worship and explicitly religious instruction.  As a practical matter, the litigation involved 
religious primary and secondary schools, usually Catholic.  Virtually everyone at the time 
assumed that the ban encompassed all houses of worship, and as a matter of logic, it also 
included religious non-profits primarily engaged in faith-intensive forms of social service. 
 
 By the early years of the 21st century, however, the Court’s interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause considerably narrowed the prohibition on state funding of religion.  In 
place of a prohibition on aid for “pervasively sectarian” institutions, the Court found two paths to 
a much wider range of funding for religious non-profits.  First, in accord with the general themes 
of this chapter, the Court shifted from an institutional focus to a more precise prohibition on 
government funding of  “specifically religious” activities.36  The category of “pervasively 
sectarian” entities is now irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law, but the distinction between 
secular and specifically religious activity remains central.  Second, the Court distinguished direct 
aid from indirect aid, such as voucher-based financing of private schools.37  The ban on funding 
of “specifically religious activities” applies to any program in which the government provides 
direct support, such as subsidy for the salaries of personnel or payment of overhead expenses.  
When government aid depends solely on the uncoerced choice of program beneficiaries, 
                                                 
35 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) is the source of that phrase, but the concept had its 
genesis in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
36 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 846-848 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
37 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); see also Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Services 
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
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however, the institution to which the beneficiary directs the aid is free to provide services 
intertwined with specifically religious content. 
 
 These two tracks of funding enable and regulate the federal government’s initiatives for 
engaging faith-based institutions in the provision of social welfare services.  Originally framed as 
the Faith Based and Community Initiative of President George W. Bush, and continued as 
President Obama’s program for Faith Based and Neighborhood Partnerships, these efforts guide 
the use of government resources in social welfare programs by reference to the constitutional 
norms appropriate to direct and indirect government support.  With respect to direct support, 
federal regulations and guidance materials define the relevant limit on what types of activities 
may be supported by government grants.38  Private institutions that receive these grants must use 
them only to support services with secular content; social services that include religious content, 
if offered, must be privately financed and separated by time or place from publicly financed 
services.   
 
 When the government’s support is indirect, however, these requirements of separation do 
not apply.  The set of eligible providers may include those who use specifically religious 
language or concepts to deliver the service. Nevertheless, those who design programs of indirect 
aid must ensure that all beneficiaries have adequate secular options for receiving the service.   
The constitutional logic of indirect aid depends on the free choice of beneficiaries between 
secular and religious options for receiving the service.  If the beneficiary has secular choices that 
                                                 
38 See Executive Order 13279, Fundamental Principles and Policymaking Criteria for 
Partnerships with Faith-Based and Other Neighborhood Organizations, as amended Nov. 17, 
2010, § 2(f), available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/17/executive-
order-fundamental-principles-and-policymaking-criteria-partner. 
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are qualitatively adequate and reasonably accessible, and the beneficiary nonetheless chooses a 
program with religious content, then the government should not be held responsible for the 
beneficiary’s religious experience. 
 
 This shift to the two-path structure of Establishment Clause law represents a significant 
opening for religious institutions to participate in programs of government-funded social welfare 
services.  Some who assert the “freedom of the church,” however, believe that the current 
structure remains unduly restrictive.  By forbidding direct aid to faith-integrated programs, they 
claim, the government discriminates against religious providers who are not willing or able to 
segregate secular and religious elements of their programs, as well as those whose services do 
not fall within programs of indirect financing.  
 
 What these critics see as discrimination, we view as appropriate and focused concern for 
important constitutional values.  Our counterarguments are grounded in the fundamental 
character of civil government, as well as respect for the dignity of program beneficiaries.  As we 
explain in our book, 39 a core characteristic of the American experiment has been its commitment 
to the secular character of civil authority.  Among the most important aspects of that character is 
the idea that civil government should not use religion as a means to the state’s own ends, 
however laudable those goals might be.40   
 
                                                 
39 See Chapter 1 of Secular Government, Religious People.   
40 This limitation does not preclude all relationships between government and faith-intensive 
programs of service, but such programs are subject to special limitations on funding and 
concerns about the free choice of beneficiaries.  In the absence of such protections, the 
government is fairly held responsible for the religious indoctrination of program beneficiaries.  
See id., Chapter 3. 
 28 
 The concern for the dignity of program beneficiaries, by contrast, is recognized – or at 
least conceded – by even the most religion-friendly architects of the relationship between 
government and faith-based service providers.  Put most simply, programs that receive direct 
government aid may not condition the delivery of government-financed services on the 
willingness of beneficiaries to engage in religious activities.  Any specifically religious activities 
offered by such programs must be distinct from the government-funded services, and completely 
voluntary for beneficiaries.  To require less than that would be to deny the fundamental dignity 
of aid beneficiaries, by exposing them to religious coercion as the price of receiving public 
assistance. 
 
 Advocates of a strong “freedom of the church” have been especially concerned about the 
possibility that receipt of government support will bring limitations on providers’ right to prefer 
co-religionists in delivering those services.  Prior to the Faith-Based Initiative, most federal 
agencies required all grant recipients to refrain from engaging in various forms of employment 
discrimination, including based on religion.  The agencies provided no exception to religious 
grantees.  Thus, any religious entity that received public funding was required to agree not to 
prefer co-religionists in employment.  The rules that emerged under the Faith Based Initiative 
directly and immediately address this concern.  Unless funding statutes require otherwise, the 
rules assure faith-based grant recipients that their freedom to prefer co-religionists would be 
preserved.  
 
For-Profit Corporations 
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 As we explained at the beginning of the chapter, corporate entities, including businesses, 
have the legal right to adopt and manifest a religious identity.  The decision to claim a religious 
identity belongs to those who have legal control over the entity.  Others have unpacked the 
complex issues of corporate law embedded in that decision, including questions concerning how 
disagreements among owners, or related issues of control, affect the entity’s claim of a religious 
identity.  But, from our perspective, that claim is a private matter to be resolved among the 
corporation’s constituents by ordinary legal norms. 
 
 Our focus is limited to the implications that should follow from that assertion.  In terms 
of expressive freedom, the law gives business owners significant latitude to use corporate assets 
to advance religious messages, even if those messages have no direct relationship to the goods or 
services provided.  For example, businesses can display religious texts or give customers 
religious materials.  Moreover, businesses are free to emphasize the role that religious values 
play in their corporate practices.  Hobby Lobby closed on Sundays; many businesses owned by 
observant Jews have long closed on Saturdays and other holy days.  Businesses may emphasize 
certain music, videos, or publications that have religious themes, and refuse to carry others that 
they deem inappropriate for religious reasons. 
 
 From the law’s perspective, a corporation’s assertion of a religious identity will only 
matter when the manifestations of that identity collide with the entity’s legal duties to 
employees, customers, and others.  The most frequent locus for these collisions is the 
employment relationship, and we turn to that first, before considering relationships with 
customers. 
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Employees 
 
 In what ways might the religious identity of a for-profit corporation make a difference for 
its employees?  Some businesses have argued that, in order to fully embrace their religious 
identity, employment must be restricted to those who share the faith commitments of the 
business owners.41  Other businesses have required employees to participate in religious 
observances during the work day, and have disciplined employees who fail to do so.  These 
employers’ practices would seem obviously to violate Title VII, which prohibits employment 
discrimination based on religion.  But, in these instances, the employers have argued that they 
fall within Title VII’s exemption for religious entities.  The exemption reads: 
 
This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association, educational 
institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular 
religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society of its activities. 
 
The governing law interpreting this exemption limits it to entities that are “primarily religious” in 
their character and activities.  This limitation applies to both non-profit and for-profit entities.  
Indeed, the EEOC has ruled ineligible a number of prominent non-profits that have religious 
                                                 
41 McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985).  
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origins, affiliations, and titles, because the organizations’ activities no longer reflected significant 
religious content.42  
 
 Although for-profit entities are theoretically capable of meeting the “primarily religious” 
standard, no judicial decision has ever extended the exemption to a for-profit business.  The 
leading case, EEOC v. Townley Engineering Company,43 interpreted “primarily religious” in 
terms of the content of the business.  Because the company manufactured mining equipment, the 
court ruled that the productive activity of the business had no relationship with religion, even if 
the owners engaged in various forms of religious expression in the workplace. 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby may call into question the EEOC’s 
effective exclusion of businesses from the class of “religious corporations” under § 702.  A firm 
like Hobby Lobby that wanted to hire only co-religionists could argue either that it falls under 
the definition of “religious corporation” in § 702, or that the Title VII bar on religion-based 
discrimination imposes a substantial burden on their religious exercise.44 If either argument 
succeeded, the class of entities – including businesses – legally permitted to prefer co-religionists 
in employment would expand considerably. 
 
                                                 
42 See EEOC v. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1993); Fike v. 
United Methodist Children's Home, Inc., 709 F.2d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 1983).  See generally 
EEOC Informal Discussion Letter, Title VII – Religious Organization Exception, December 28, 
2007, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2007/religious_organization_exception_dec_28_2007.html 
43 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988). 
44 This would be a RFRA claim against application to the employer of Title VII’s prohibition on 
religious discrimination. 
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 We think this would be a profound mistake.  Recall that the original version of § 702 
exempted religious organizations from Title VII’s ban on religious discrimination only with 
respect to employees that are directly engaged in religious activities.  Congress broadened the 
exemption to avoid line-drawing problems, but in doing so has already removed a significant 
number of non-religious jobs from the protections of Title VII.   
 
 Broadening the number of exempted employers – and jobs – has two problematic 
consequences.  First, it further limits employment opportunities on the basis of religion, and thus 
conflicts with one of the central purposes of Title VII, which is designed to reduce status-based 
barriers to employment.  Second, permitting even more employers to select employees based on 
religion would increase religion-based segregation within society, as what used to be religiously 
diverse workplaces became religiously insular.  We firmly believe that religious equality in the 
labor market has promoted civic harmony, and helped to mitigate the divisiveness and conflict 
that have plagued other parts of the world.  
  
 The traditional limitation of the § 702 exemption to entities that are “primarily religious” 
in their character and activities seems to us a much better way of reconciling the competing 
concerns.  In applying that standard, the EEOC and courts should be open to the possibility of 
for-profit employers qualifying as “primarily religious.”  The best candidates for that status 
would be businesses whose productive activities involve goods or services that have thickly 
religious content.  For example, a store exclusively devoted to selling books and other goods 
linked to a particular faith tradition should qualify as “primarily religious.”  
 
 33 
 Even if an entity does so qualify, it still may enjoy some legal protection for employment 
decisions that affect the religious character of the organization. If a for-profit corporation hires 
an employee specifically to advance its religious mission, that employee may well fall within the 
scope of the ministerial exception.  To the best of our knowledge, all reported decisions that 
involve the ministerial exception have arisen in the context of a house of worship or a religious 
non-profit entity.  But we see no reason in principle that a for-profit entity would be barred from 
raising the ministerial exception.   
 
 For example, imagine that Hobby Lobby hires a corporate chaplain who is an ordained 
minister in the owners’ faith tradition.  The chaplain is hired to provide counseling for 
employees, as well as regular worship and other religious services for the owners and any 
employees who want to participate.45  What if the owners dismiss the chaplain for promoting 
theological beliefs inconsistent with the beliefs of the owners, and the chaplain files a claim 
under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on religion? 
 
 Or imagine that religious authorities required kosher or halal butcher shops to employ a 
full-time religious inspector, who would constantly monitor the practices of other employees in 
the shop and resolve any disputed questions of religious law.46  If such an inspector filed a 
discrimination claim against his butcher shop employer, could the shop invoke the ministerial 
exception? 
 
                                                 
45 Employees who do not want to attend such worship services must be excused, and may not 
suffer any employment consequences from their refusal to participate.  See EEOC v. Townley 
Engineering, 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988). 
46 See Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington, 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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 The best argument against allowing the owners to assert the ministerial exception is that 
expanding the doctrine to encompass for-profit entities presents a problem of the slippery slope.  
Could the employer then designate a significant portion of the workforce as “missionaries,” who 
spend most of their day performing ordinary tasks, but also have some responsibility for 
“ministerial duties” such as leading prayer or sharing religious messages with customers?  Recall 
that Cheryl Perich, the plaintiff in Hosanna-Tabor, spent the bulk of her work hours in secular 
teaching and related duties.  The predominance of secular tasks did not remove Perich from the 
class of “ministerial” employees.  But that conclusion reflects an implicit judgment about the 
employer, a religious school.  Given that the school’s mission included inculcation of the faith, 
the Supreme Court appropriately deferred to the school’s decision about how to allocate 
responsibilities for leading the children in prayer and worship. 
 
 For entities that are not engaged in “primarily religious” activities, however, we would 
expect the ministerial exception to take on a far more limited character.  Where the Court in 
Hosanna Tabor substantially deferred to the religious entity’s allocation of responsibilities, a 
business entity should only be able to claim the exception with respect to positions that have 
exclusively and explicitly religious duties.  Moreover, the employer should clearly communicate 
to the employee both the religious character of the duties and the legal consequences that follow 
from that ministerial character. 
 
Customers 
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 A religious business is also likely to manifest its religious identity in relationships with 
customers.  We have written about the complicated issues that arise when business entities 
decide, on religious grounds, not to serve particular classes of customers.47   The most prominent 
recent examples include some businesses’ refusal to serve same-sex couples, or to provide goods 
for use at same-sex weddings. We think that the public character of these businesses, the sweep 
of goods and services that such refusals might cover, and the risks of both material and stigmatic 
harm to same sex couples counsel strongly against exemptions of such businesses from relevant 
anti-discrimination laws. 
 
 A very different set of issues arises when the government attempts, or is asked by 
consumers, to regulate the religious quality of goods sold by a business.  When a business 
advertises that its meat is “100% kosher,” should a court or government agency be able to decide 
whether that claim is truthful?  This question does not implicate the religious freedom of 
merchants.  Instead, this issue focuses on the government’s competence to articulate and apply 
religious standards. 
 
 In a variety of contexts, courts have quite appropriately held that the government has no 
authority to declare what the standards of religious dietary law are, or whether a particular 
merchant has complied with those standards.  Attempts by several states to create government 
                                                 
47 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same Sex Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 Northwestern J. 
L. & Soc. Pol’y 274 (2010). 
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agencies that would enforce kosher fraud laws have been held unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause.48 
 
 By contrast, the state should be able to adjudicate whether specific factual assertions by 
merchants are truthful.  Such assertions include what animal, or part of an animal, particular 
meat comes from, as well as whether the meat has been inspected and approved by a specific 
religious authority. These are questions of objectively verifiable fact; neither involves the content 
of religious norms, or appraisals of fidelity to them. Questions of that type are off-limits to the 
government, even if they arise in a context where commercial fraud is a possibility.  States must 
find secular avenues for policing such fraud, and leave religious policing to private parties, 
including customers and religious authorities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 As readers of this volume know, a number of other scholars in the field are drawn to 
sweeping generalizations about “church autonomy” and “freedom of the church.”  In past 
writing, they have been willing to leave to another day the hard questions raised by their 
approach – in particular, who qualifies as “the church,” and in what specific contexts should the 
state treat “the church” as autonomous.  We think this failure to attend to particular and difficult 
questions is the path to over-broad regimes of religious exemption and unjustified norms of 
religious privilege. 
 
                                                 
48 See Mark Popovsky, The Constitutional Complexity of Kosher Food Laws, 44 Columbia J. L. 
& Soc. Probs. 75, 89-93 (2010) (citing cases from New Jersey, Maryland, and New York) 
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 Religious exemptions are not a function of private freedoms, of “the church” or 
otherwise.  Instead, they arise primarily from an understanding of what government may not 
appraise, decide, or support. Corporate identity is connected to this understanding only because 
of the likelihood of, and frequency with which, such questions will arise.  Whether as house of 
worship, religious non-profit, or religiously identified for-profit, the corporate character of 
religious identity serves only as a rough marker for the need to be sensitive to the appearance of 
such questions, and can serve as a guide to reasoning about them at the margin.  At the most 
fundamental level, what is off-limits to the state is a constant, and does not change by virtue of 
private choices to express religious identity in a variety of forms, institutional, associational, or 
otherwise. 
  
 
 
